Earlier this week, I appeared before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs as part of its study of Bill C-22, the government’s lawful access bill, joining Leah West and Aaron Shull on the opening panel. I last testified on the bill in May before the House public safety committee, and the amendments adopted in June meant this opening statement started from a different place: the bill is better than when it was first introduced, but more is needed. With only four minutes, I focused on three fixes. Mandatory metadata retention remains constitutionally vulnerable with little evidence of its necessity and should be removed from the bill or, failing that, capped at 30 days. On encryption, the amended definition of systemic vulnerability excludes risks that relate only to people subject to a warrant, which leaves room to order providers to build access capabilities into their systems; the exclusion should be removed and the bill should state directly that no regulation or order may require a provider to weaken encryption. The subscriber information production order relies on the lowest threshold in Canadian criminal law and applies to anyone who provides services to the public, which Justice officials confirmed could include a daycare, and it should be limited to telecommunications service providers and require reasonable grounds to believe. Several senators returned to metadata retention and the 30-day cap in the questions that followed. A video of the opening statement is embedded below, followed by the text.
Appearance before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs, November 16, 2026
Good afternoon. My name is Michael Geist. I am a law professor at the University of Ottawa, where I hold the Canada Research Chair in Internet and E-commerce Law. I appear in a personal capacity, representing only my own views.
Lawful access has been debated in Canada for decades, and I have written and testified on it for more than twenty years. A consistent challenge over those years is the tension between the need for modern, effective police powers and a full, Charter-compliant approach to privacy. These are hard issues, and getting them right has depended on an openness to amendment, to fixing bills where needed. And so Bill C-2 was, in parts, improved on in Bill C-22, and Bill C-22 was improved with amendments in June. Those changes were important, but more is needed. I’d like to focus on three concerns, though others, including gag orders and the competitive costs, are important too.
The first is metadata retention, a provision that did not appear in prior bills. Bill C-22 started with a maximum of one year of metadata retention, which was later cut to six months, with an added requirement that the retained categories be essential to investigations. But the provision remains constitutionally vulnerable with little evidence of its necessity. Metadata may not include the content of a message, but it tells a story: who we contact and when and where and from what device. The Court of Justice of the European Union has held that retention itself interferes with privacy and that general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data cannot be justified in the fight against crime.
The amended C-22 doesn’t answer that. If police need access to metadata, the Criminal Code already provides targeted preservation and production orders tied to a specific investigation, with judicial oversight. Given the lack of a strong evidentiary case for the provision and its constitutional vulnerability, Bill C-22’s metadata regime should be removed. Failing that, a 30-day cap would address concerns about meeting immediate investigative needs prior to obtaining a preservation order.
The second is encryption. Amendments added some notable limits to the technical capability provisions, including a clause stating that providers cannot be compelled to decrypt. However, the amended definition of systemic vulnerability excludes risks that relate only to people subject to a warrant, which leaves room to order providers to build access capabilities into their systems. As security experts regularly warn, there is no distinction between good guys and bad guys when it comes to weaker encryption. And C-22 isn’t just about weakening encryption; it also raises the risk of requiring other surveillance or data-extraction mechanisms.
Experience bears that out, as the Salt Typhoon hack in the U.S. demonstrates. Providers of services that rely on encryption have been unequivocal about their inability to offer certain services in Canada if the law remains unchanged. Experience also bears that out, as Apple’s withdrawal of a privacy-protective service from the UK showed. AI has only heightened cybersecurity concerns, making vulnerabilities even riskier. The exclusion should be removed, and the bill should state directly that no regulation or order may require a provider to weaken encryption.
The third is the subscriber information production order. The threshold for the order, reasonable grounds to suspect, is the lowest in Canadian criminal law, requiring no actual belief that a crime has occurred. It applies here to information that the Supreme Court recognized in the Spencer and Bykovets cases as carrying a reasonable expectation of privacy. Further, the scope is astonishing as it applies to any person who provides services to the public. Anyone. As Justice officials confirmed to this committee, that could include a daycare. The Privacy Commissioner has recommended limiting the order to telecommunications service providers. I agree, and the threshold should be reasonable grounds to believe.
The current bill is better than when it was first introduced, but it still raises serious privacy and security concerns. None of the changes I have proposed are incompatible with effective law enforcement. They would help ensure the framework gives law enforcement the tools they need, withstands Charter scrutiny, respects Canadians’ privacy rights, and sustains public trust. I look forward to your questions.











