Yesterday's posting focused on the role that the Competition Bureau should play in addressing DRM misuse.  While that role is an important one, it is by no means sufficient to address the misuse problem.  The Bureau will undoubtedly be hampered by inadequate resources, institutional bias against taking "risky" cases, and statutory limitations that constrict its role to abuse of dominance cases.  Therefore, in addition to Bureau oversight, the law should contain provisions that establish strong disincentives to overreaching or abusive use of DRMs.

Last fall's Sony rootkit case, in which Sony placed hundreds of thousands of personal computers at risk for viruses and other security breaches by surreptitiously placing DRM on dozens of its music CDs, is a model illustration of the havoc that DRM misuse can generate.  While the Sony case is not an abuse of dominant position case, there are good policy reasons to create disincentives to ensure that overzealous companies will not misuse DRM. 

Several potential disincentives come to mind.