Days after Quebecor unveiled its bid to acquire Telus, the Globe and Mail reports that the government has privately signalled it is open to reversing its policy commitment to four national wireless players, returning to a three-company oligopoly. That would be a remarkable shift, given that when then-Minister François-Philippe Champagne approved the transfer of Freedom Mobile’s spectrum to Videotron in March 2023, he described it as a chance to create the fourth national player governments had pursued for decades. Yet three years later, Prime Minister Mark Carney suggests an oligopoly can sometimes produce more competition with fewer players, while Quebecor CEO Pierre Karl Péladeau cites Europe as an example where government policy has led to three dominant providers. It appears we will hear a lot about Europe, but this is an apples-to-“Orange” comparison (sorry). Unlike Quebecor’s proposal, Europe’s three-player markets include mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) that buy wholesale access to the networks, have featured merger approvals with serious binding commitments, and have no bar on foreign ownership.
First, claims that Europe has settled on three players are overstated. Of Europe’s five largest mobile markets, only the UK currently has three network operators, with Germany, Italy, and Spain at four and France’s proposed breakup of SFR still facing regulatory review. Moreover, government policy did not support consolidation, as the European Commission blocked four-to-three mergers or approved them only with strict conditions. For example, it approved the Italian merger of Wind and Tre only after a remedy brought in France’s Iliad as a new fourth network and approved the Orange-MásMóvil deal in Spain in 2024 only after spectrum was sold to Digi, similarly leaving the market with four players.
The regulatory mood in Europe may be shifting toward consolidation, but changes come with significant conditions. When the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority approved the Vodafone-Three merger in 2024, it insisted on an eight-year, £11 billion network investment programme, caps on certain mobile prices for three years, and pre-set wholesale prices and contract terms for MVNOs. Quebecor accepted enforceable commitments when it acquired Freedom as part of the Rogers-Shaw merger, but its public proposal for Telus offers no divestitures and no comparable pricing or MVNO commitments.
Focusing on the network owners also does not address the competitive impact of MVNOs, which now account for about one in five mobile subscribers in the UK. I have been writing about the CRTC’s weak policies on MVNOs for more than a decade, and its 2021 wireless decision, quickly dubbed the “MVN-no” decision, limited mandated access to regional carriers that already hold spectrum. The just-released government Telecom Competition Roadmap does not change that dynamic.
Ownership of European carriers also shows how inapt the comparison to Canada is. Europe’s three-player markets are dominated by subsidiaries of global operators: Austria’s three carriers are controlled by América Móvil, Deutsche Telekom, and CK Hutchison, Ireland has Vodafone, CK Hutchison, and Xavier Niel’s Eir, and it was a French company, Iliad, that the European Commission relied upon to preserve a fourth network in Italy. A Canadian three-player market would consist of three domestic incumbents sheltered by foreign ownership restrictions that still apply to Bell, Rogers, and Telus. As I argued earlier this week, and told a Senate committee back in 2012, opening the door to foreign investment would do far more for competition than shrinking the number of competitors.
If the goal is a European-style wireless market, neither Quebecor nor the government can cherry-pick the required conditions. In other words, merger deals that reduce the number of competitors typically also include mandated MVNO access and binding and enforceable investment and pricing commitments, and, perhaps most importantly, take place in markets with no foreign ownership restrictions that artificially limit the strength of market competitors. Without openness to foreign ownership and regulatory efforts to enhance competition, citing Europe is little more than cover for a Canadian oligopoly with one fewer competitor, an outcome that would overturn years of Canadian government policy that sought to counter some of the world’s highest wireless prices.








