How Facebook Responded to Tunisian Hacks
January 25, 2011
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Episode 274: Mark Musselman on What Stakeholders Really Think About the Government’s Reversal of the CRTC Online Streaming Act Decision
byMichael Geist

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uhm, and what about the rest of us?
Hopefully I don’t get slapped down for lifting this one sentence from the article (fair dealing right? does that still exist?)
> First, all Tunisian requests for Facebook were routed to
> an https server.
Good for Tunisians. What about the rest of the world that is susceptible to Facebook’s apparent lack of care for the security and privacy of it’s users?
Sure, anyone can *optionally* choose to use the secure https service, but really? Everyone has to know that? Does my mom? I doubt it. Does your mom?
Why is Faceboot so careless with everyone’s privacy?
Oh Ms. Stoddart? Where are you?
Maybe she has already come down on FB for this lack of mandatory security of one’s privacy. TBH, I wouldn’t go near FB with a 100′ pole so I have not really read her criticisms of FB’s privacy (doesn’t affect me), but I sure hope this lack of mandatory encrypted connections is one of her requirements.
…
The real problem was that the Tunisians were getting the Facebook data for free. Everyone else is paying for it.